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CORBIS CORP. V. AMAZON. COM, INC. -
NEEDLESSLY ENDORSING OVERLY
STRICT U.S. REGISTRATION
REQUIREMENTS IN COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION
SARA GOLDFARB*
INTRODUCTION
United States Copyright Law is primarily "a creature of
statute."1 Though there have only been two chief statutory
schemes of Copyright Law since its inception in 1790, Congress
has enacted countless bills and amendments between each
evolutionary leap. 2 Of the many notable advancements realized
with each iteration of the law, one of the most pervasive is the
enduring effort to free the law from overly-burdensome
formalities, and to allow the "authors" of the copyrightable works
greater freedom to protect their creations. 3 The ever-swelling
* J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2006; B.A., English &
American Literature, cum laude, Brandeis University, May 1999. The author would like
to extend sincere thanks to Professor Ettie Ward for her invaluable guidance in the
development of this Comment, as well as to the staff of St. John's Journal of Legal
Commentary for their support and assistance.
1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, PAUL MARCUS, DAVID A. MYERS & DAVID NIMMER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT 1 (6th ed. 2000) [hereinafter NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS]
(discussing chronological periods of statutory development).
2 See id. at 1-3 (discussing 1909 Copyright Act and 1976 Copyright Act); see also
Kenneth D. Crews, Looking Ahead and Shaping the Future: Provoking Change in
Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 549, 550 (2002) (noting 50 bills have been
enacted since 1976 Act); Michael J. Remington, The Ever-Whirling Cycle of Change:
Copyright and Cyberspace, 3 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 213, 214 (2002) (reviewing that few areas
of law have experienced such dramatic change as Copyright Law).
3 See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMmER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.16
[B] [1] [b] [i], at 9-15 (2004) hereinafter NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (noting binding
registration requirements for published works prior to 1976 Act); see also Michael Jones,
Note, Eldred v. Ashcroft: The Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 85, 89 (2004) (describing how 1909 Act greatly expanded length of
copyright term from original Copyright Act of 1790); Crews, supra note 2, at 551
(reviewing relaxation of "formalities" throughout Copyright Law development).
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internationalization of Copyright Law has operated as a powerful
influence, shaping United States Copyright Law and pressuring
Congress to temper historically rigid requirements. 4 The current
Act, promulgated in 1976, contained a number of ameliorative
features intended to rescue copyright authors from the dire and
fatal forfeitures of the previous 1909 Act.5 Though registration
has remained a resolute prerequisite to bringing an action for
copyright infringement, courts are deeply divided on the details
entailed in the registration procedure. 6
17 U.S.C. § 411(a) prohibits a party from bringing suit in
federal court for copyright infringement "until registration of the
copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title."7 As
demonstrated by the profound rift that divides courts on this
issue, even on the intra-district level, 8 this section can be
interpreted in either of two ways. Some courts hold that there is
no federal subject matter jurisdiction until the Copyright Office
grants the application and issues a certificate of registration, or,
conversely, denies the application, essentially barring from
litigation any plaintiff whose work is pending registration. 9
4 See NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, § 7.16[B][1](b][iii], at 1-46
(reviewing amendments required to comply with Berne Convention); see also BRUCE P.
KELLER & JEFFREY P. CUNARD, COPYRIGHT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE § 1:3.3 (Nov.
2004) (noting impact on formal requirements in light of the Berne Convention
Implementation Act); NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 2 (discussing
numerous amendments enacted to comport with international harmonization).
5 See KELLER, supra note 4, § 1:3.2 (discussing how 1976 Act minimizes previously
drastic consequences of failing to include copyright notice); see also NIMMER, CASES AND
MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that 1976 Act superseded 1909 Act "in toto");
Crews, supra note 2, at 551 (explaining that 1976 Act initiated a "trajectory" which
culminated in grant of copyrights without many formalities).
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2005) (stating no action may be instituted until the copyright
claim is registered); see also NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, §
7.16[B][1][a][i], at 1-29 (discussing registration as necessity for statutory damages);
Crews, supra note 2, at 571 (stating statutory damages and attorney's fees are incentives
to register copyright claim).
7 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2005).
8 See Corbis Corp. v. UGO Networks, Inc. 322 F. Supp. 2d 520, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(holding approval or refusal of registration is prerequisite to jurisdiction); Well-Made Toy
Mfg. Corp. v. King Kullen Grocery Co. Inc, 210 F. Supp. 2d 147, 157 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(finding that infringement action may commence upon application); Capitol Records, Inc.
v. Wings Digital Corp., 218 F. Supp. 2d 280, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (requiring registration
certification or denial prior to conferring subject matter jurisdiction); Salerno v. City
Univ. of N.Y., 191 F. Supp. 2d 352, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (concluding that application
submission is sufficient to confer jurisdiction).
9 See Xoom, Inc. v. Imageline, Inc., 323 F.3d 279, 283 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding
registration as jurisdictional prerequisite); Strategy Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1,
3-4 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding that certificate is jurisdictional prerequisite to filing
infringement suit); Olan Mills, Inc. v. Linn Photo Co., 23 F.3d 1345, 1349 (8th Cir. 1994)
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Other courts find that a pending registration is sufficient to
confer federal jurisdiction for an infringement claim; all that is
required is filing an application, fee, and a copy of the work with
the Copyright Office.1O
The domestic implications of such judicial discord manifest
primarily in a lack of uniformity, certainty and efficiency.
Potential litigants cannot be confident that they will be accorded
subject matter jurisdiction without a thorough examination of
any given District Court's prior holding on the issue.11 Further,
depending on the court, the litigant may have the opportunity to
amend her complaint, or her case may be simply dismissed. 12
Even more troubling are the potential international
repercussions of a stringent reading of the registration
requirement. Given the United States accession to international
copyright treaties which frown on procedural formalities, the
reading of a strict registration requirement into Title 17 creates a
danger of running afoul of such agreements. 13 Moreover, in light
of the comparably lax requirements imposed on foreign authors,
strict domestic regulations prejudicially confine United States
authors into a narrower realm of statutory regulation.14
Recently in Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.Com, Inc.,15 the District
Court for the Western District of Washington was asked to rule
on this issue and declined to follow the registration-on-
(noting timing of registration determines whether statutory or actual damages can be
recovered).
10 See Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 365 (5th
Cir. 2004) (noting Fifth Circuit precedent that requires only receipt of application);
Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. American Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 633-34 (M.D.N.C. 2004)
(stating filing of completed application is sufficient to enable suit); International Kitchen
Exhaust Cleaning Ass'n v. Power Washers of North America, 81 F. Supp. 2d 70, 72
(D.D.C. 2000) (holding, as a question of first impression for the circuit, that an author
may sue once the Copyright Office has received her application).
11 See supra note 8; KELLER, supra note 4, at § 5:3.1 (noting courts have split on
whether filing application for registration is enough to confer jurisdiction).
12 See infra note 120; Oyster Software Inc. v. Forms Processing Inc., No. C-00-
0724(JCS), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22520, *32-33 (Dec. 6, 2001) (allowing amendment of
complaint to allege that copyright had been registered).
13 See infra note 110-14; see also Graeme W. Austin, The Berne Convention as a
Canon of Construction: Moral Rights After Dastar, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 111, 131
(2005) (noting courts must often remind litigants that changes made by the Berne
Convention are "meant to be taken seriously"); Crews, supra note 2, at 571-72 (noting
formalities are "heretical" in the Berne era).
14 See infra note 123; see also MATTHEW BENDER & Co., 2-USA INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 5 [3] [a] (2004) (noting registration requirements as
prerequisite to bringing infringement actions applies only to U.S. authors).
15 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
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application approach.1 6 In dismissing a large portion of the case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court employed a plain
language approach to the statute and held that "§ 411(a) gives
those who have applied and obtained registration and those who
have applied and failed to obtain registration the right to file suit
in federal court."1 7 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not
yet ruled on the issue, leaving the courts in that district to parse
together rationales from the deeply divided district and circuit
courts around the country.,s
This Comment criticizes the reasoning and outcome of the
District Court in light of its effects on American copyright
applicants, the judicial system and the internationalization of
Copyright Law. The court's conclusion that litigants are not
conferred with federal subject matter jurisdiction for copyright
infringement claims is flawed in three crucial respects. First, it
is based on an erroneous plain language reading of § 411 of the
Copyright Act. Second, it fails to take into account all of the
relevant satellite sections that bear on the issue of registration.
And third, it inaccurately concludes that the statutory language
is unambiguous, thereby ignoring pertinent extrinsic statutory
construction tools. Part I of this Comment examines the
reasoning the District Court employed in reaching its decision.
Part II exposes the defects in the court's approach in its failure to
properly apply well-established methods of statutory analyses.
Finally, Part III raises concerns with the overly strict United
States registration requirements when viewed against the
international background of Copyright Law.
16 See id. at 1111-14 (holding that 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) preserves right to file suit in
federal court only for those who have applied and have either been granted or denied
certificate of registration).
17 Id. at 1113 (holding that all other parties are dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
18 See Loree Rodkin Management Corp. v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053,
1054-57 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (relying on various circuits to hold that "registration" refers to
issuance of certificate); Zito v. Steeplechase Films, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1025 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (citing three circuits, in addition to Ninth Circuit precedent, to conclude that
plaintiff can cure a jurisdictional defect with amended complaint upon registration);
Brush Creek Media, Inc. v. Boujaklian, No. C-02-3491(EDL), 2002 WL 1906620, *2-4
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2002) (relying, primarily, on Ninth Circuit precedent to hold that
certificate is a prerequisite).
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I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION
A. Statement of the Facts
Corbis Corporation is in the business of representing and
distributing photographers' works, and is paid a fee for licensing
those photographs. 19 In addition to licensing art images, Corbis
enters into contracts for photographs of celebrities. 20 Amazon is a
corporation engaged in the electronic commerce industry. 21 In
addition to operating the IMDb.com website (an informative
database concerning actors, movies and the entertainment
industry),22 Amazon also maintains the Amazon.com website
which not only sells its own products, but also hosts third-party
vendors ("zShops") who showcase additional products. 23 Corbis
alleged that it held copyright interests in two photographs that
Amazon placed on its website IMDb.com, and in 230 additional
images that were allegedly copied, displayed, and sold by zShops
vendors through the Amazon.com website. 24  The parties
stipulated that some of the images that Corbis claimed had been
infringed were submitted to the Copyright Office, but had not yet
received a certificate of registration by the Register of
Copyrights. 25 Amazon contended that, per § 411(a), the court had
subject matter jurisdiction with regard only to those images
which had been approved for copyright registration.26
B. The District Court's Opinion
The District Court first summarized the two sides on the
contested issue and inventoried the District and Circuit Courts
19 See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1096-97 (discussing corporation's practice).
20 See id. (reviewing Corbis corporation's contracts).
21 See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.Com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1094-96 (W.D. Wash.
2004) (discussing Amazon's various internet platforms).
22 See http://www.imdb.com (last visited October 24, 2005).
23 See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1094 (discussing how zShops 'listings" are operated);
see also http://www.amazon.com/ (last visited October 10, 2005).
24 See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1093 (noting that Corbis provided both Amazon and
vendors with notice of infringement when it filed suit).
25 Id. at 1111 (noting Amazon agrees that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred for
those images that have been granted copyright registration).
26 Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.Com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004)
(discussing Amazon's argument that jurisdiction must be denied to those images for
which registration is still pending).
424 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:2
which have fallen on either side of the divide.27 In the absence of
Ninth Circuit precedent on the effectiveness of copyright
registration upon the filing of the application, and faced with an
intra-circuit split on the issue,28 the District Court agreed with
those courts that hold the issuance, or denial, of a certificate of
registration an absolute prerequisite to federal subject matter
jurisdiction. 2 9
The District Court assembled an opinion based on an analysis
of only a few of the relevant statutory sections regarding
"registration" in the Copyright Act, and similar interpretations in
both the Ninth and Second Circuit courts. 30 The court relied,
primarily, on a strict "plain meaning" construction of 17 U.S.C.
§ 410(a)3 1 and § 411(a). 32 § 411(a) states, in relevant part, that
jurisdiction is not conferred "until registration of the copyright
claim has been made in accordance with [the Copyright Act] ."33
§ 410(a), according to the court, elucidates that a claim must be
approved by the Register of Copyrights before it is "registered" to
grant jurisdiction.34 § 411(a) provides an important exception
such that those applicants who have been denied registration are
27 Id. at 1111-12 (referencing, primarily, other Ninth Circuit decisions).
28 For Ninth Circuit courts which have held that a potential infringement plaintiff
need only prove payment of the application fee, deposit of the work in question, and
receipt by the Copyright Office of the application, see Gable-Leigh, Inc. v. North American
Miss, No. CV 01-01019 MMM(SHX), 2001 WL 521695, *4 (C.D. Cal. April 13, 2001) and
Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp. 985, 993-94 (C.D. Cal. 1996). But for Ninth Circuit courts
holding that a certificate of copyright registration from the Copyright Office is a
prerequisite to bringing a copyright infringement claim, see Oyster Software, Inc. v.
Forms Processing, Inc., No. C-00-0724(JCS), 2001 WL 1736382, *10-11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6,
2001) and Ryan v. Carl Corp, No. C 97-3873(FMS), 1998 WL 320817, *2-3 (N.D. Cal. July
15, 1998).
29 See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1112-13 (dismissing copyright claims related to non-
registered images for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
30 See id. at 1112 (acknowledging that the Court agrees with "the second group of
decisions").
31 [w]hen, after examination, the Register of Copyrights determines that ... the
material deposited constitutes copyrightable subject matter and that the other legal
and formal requirements of this title have been met, the Register shall register the
claim and issue to the applicant a certificate of registration under the seal of the
Copyright Office. For the Corbis court's reasoning that the "plain meaning" of the
language dictates that the register's approval triggers "registration."
17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2005); see Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.Com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090,
1112 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
32 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2005) (codifying regulations for "Registration and infringement
actions"); see Corbis, 351 F. Supp.2d at 1112 (reasoning that court will not insert language
into section that is not there).
33 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (indicating exceptions to general rule for categories under §
411(b)).
34 See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (citing to § 410(a)).
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also entitled to institute an action in federal court.35 Utilizing a
plain meaning approach to interpreting the two statutory
sections, the court found, therefore, that only the Register's
approval or denial can trigger a court's jurisdiction. 36 The court
found the language to exact this result because the effect of §
411(a) is to confer the right to sue on specific parties (those who
have obtained a certificate of registration and those who have
been denied registration), therefore necessarily excluding all
others.3 7
The court also relied, in part, on the persuasive authority of
other district courts, in both the Ninth and Second Circuits,
which have likewise found issuance of the registration certificate
to be a prerequisite to federal subject matter jurisdiction. 38
Though the court glossed over these cases, and did not review
their analyses in any detail, these courts essentially reasoned,
similar to the District Court here, that the plain reading of the
statutory language mandates the stated result.3 9
35 [i]n any case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee required for
registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and
registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute an action for
infringement if notice thereof, with a cop of the complaint, is served on the Register of
Copyrights.
17 U.S.C. § 411(a); see also Foraste v. Brown Univ., 248 F. Supp. 2d 71, 77 n.10 (D.R.I.
2003) (reiterating wording of statute); Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp. 985, 994 n.6 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (noting plaintiff can bring infringement claim once the Copyright Office receives his
application); Gable-Leigh, Inc. v. North American Miss, No. CV 01-01019 MMM(SHX),
2001 WL 521695, *4 (C.D. Cal. April 13, 2001) (stating evidence that Copyright Office
received a registration application satisfies jurisdictional requirement, even if application
is denied).
36 See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.Com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1112 (W.D. Wash.
2004) (asserting to hold otherwise would require Court to "overstep its interpretive
bounds").
37 See id. at 1112-13 (reasoning where a statute designates particular parties, it is
not appropriate to presume non-exclusivity); Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union
Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2000) (stating when a statute names parties who
are empowered to act, only those parties may act).
38 See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (listing courts with similar holdings); see also
Loree Rodkin Mgmt. Corp. v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1055 (C.D. Cal.
2004) (rejecting registration-on-application approach); Corbis Corp. v. UGO Networks,
Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 520, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (requiring issuance of a certificate); Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Wings Digital Corp., 218 F. Supp. 2d 280, 284 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding
certification a jurisdictional prerequisite); U-Neek, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 147 F.
Supp. 2d 158, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (concluding that registration occurs upon conveyance of
certificate).
39 See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (reasoning that "review of the plain language of
the Copyright Act supports this conclusion"); see also Loree Rodkin, 315 F. Supp. 2d at
1055 (stating "plain language unambiguously" requires issuance of a certificate); UGO
Networks, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 522 n.1 (reasoning courts that find to the contrary ignore
statute's plain language).
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II. FLAWS IN THE COURT'S STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF § 411(A) OF
THE COPYRIGHT ACT
A. Erroneous Application of Statutory Analysis
The Corbis court's examination, at the first, fails to adhere to
the well-established canons of statutory analysis and the step-by-
step procedure promulgated by the United States Supreme Court
over the years. The time-honored primary step in ascertaining
statutory meaning is to look at the words of the statute and to
enforce the common meaning of the language.40 If the language is
unambiguous, the analysis is complete and the inquiry need not
progress further.41 As dictated by the Supreme Court, the
ambiguous nature of the statutory language is established
through "reference to the language itself, the specific context in
which the language is used, and the broader context of the
statute as a whole."42 Some judges, like Justice Scalia, would
"consider the text, the whole text, and nothing but the text.
Period."43 Others agree, however, that if the language is
ambiguous, the court should look beyond the statutory language
to the legislative history for additional guidance.44 Finally, if the
legislative history does not clearly illuminate Congressional
intent, courts are free to employ traditional principles of
statutory construction. 45
40 See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (discussing search for
plain meaning); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (reaffirming first step
in analysis); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (noting if language is
plain, the court's sole function is to enforce it as such).
41 See Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 450 (discussing that inquiry ends with a "coherent"
statutory scheme); Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340 (citing criteria for cessation of the inquiry);
Maxine D. Goodman, Reconstructing the Plain Language Rule of Statutory Construction:
How and Why, 65 MONT. L. REV. 229, 229-30 (2004) (reviewing assumption that absent
contrary legislative intent, plain language must be viewed as conclusive).
42 Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341 (reiterating principle firmly established by prior
Supreme Court decisions).
43 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal? A Matter of
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1514 (1998)
(reviewing Justice Scalia's rendering of plain language rule); see Goodman, supra note 41,
at 235-36 (discussing Justice Scalia's "textualist" approach).
44 See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (noting reference to
legislative history is unnecessary where language is plain); Church of The Holy Trinity v.
United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (discussing that considerations surrounding a
statute's enactment can be a relevant inquiry); Adams v. Dole, 927 F.2d 771, 774 (4th Cir.
1991) (explaining that legislative history perusal follows plain language analysis).
45 See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453, 458 (1974) (noting that construction principles must yield to clear legislative intent);
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B. Flawed Reading of the Statute's Plain Language
The Corbis court admittedly anchored its overall conclusions
solely upon the first step: a "plain language" analysis of select
satellite sections of the Copyright Act.46 A review of other courts'
analyses clearly indicates that the language can be read in
various ways and is, therefore, "ambiguous." Yet even if the
statutory interpretation did cease with the plain language of the
statute, the reading of the Corbis court is not as competent, or
thorough, as those of other courts. § 411(a) states, in relevant
part, that any action based on copyright infringement lacks
subject matter jurisdiction until such time as "registration of the
copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title."47
As discussed above, the court construed this language, in
conjunction with a neighboring section, to determine that
"registration" is complete, and subject matter jurisdiction
granted, only to those who have received a final determination on
their application from the Copyright Office.48 However, despite
acknowledging the array of authorities that have provided a
contrary assessment of the relevant sections,49 the court confined
its analysis to a stiflingly narrow, and ultimately fatal, reading.
In so doing, the court failed to account for more logical plain
meaning interpretations which support the "registration-on-
application" approach, as illustrated below.
The court's analysis commenced with a straightforward
recitation of § 410(a) which states in full:
When, after examination, the Register of Copyrights
determines that, in accordance with the provisions of this
title, the material deposited constitutes copyrightable subject
Neuberger v. Comm'r. of Internal Revenue, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (expressing that
maxims can never override clear Congressional intent); Adams, 927 F.2d at 774 (noting
final step in analysis).
46 See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.Com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1112 (W.D. Wash.
2004) (noting "plain language" review of the Copyright Act supports its final conclusion).
47 [e]xcept for an action brought for a violation of the rights of the author under
section 106A(a), and subject to the provisions of subsection (b), no action for
infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.
17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2005).
48 See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (holding only those who have applied and
obtained registration and those who have applied and failed to obtain registration have
right to sue in federal court).
49 See id. at 1111 (acknowledging courts and leading treatise that have promoted
"application-on-registration" approach).
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matter and that the other legal and formal requirements of
this title have been met, the Register shall register the claim
and issue to the applicant a certificate of registration under
the seal of the Copyright Office.50
The court acknowledged that the registration process is
commenced with the submission of a claim. However, the court
spent negligible time reviewing its analysis of this particular
section, and purporting to rely upon a plain meaning approach,
concluded that the Register's examination and approval
necessarily antedate the registration of a claim.51
Courts from other jurisdictions, however, have declined to
adopt this particular construction, and have alternatively opted
for a different, though equally straightforward, plain language
approach. These courts read this section to apply merely to the
formalities for issuance of a registration certificate, and not to the
requirements for obtaining subject matter jurisdiction. 52 In
Iconbazaar v. America Online, Inc.,53 the court reasoned that the
language could just as easily support the "issuance of certificate"
reading, and therefore refused to rely solely on the plain
language to ascertain Congressional intent.54  This latter
interpretation seems most plausible given the title of § 410:
"Registration of claim and issuance of certificate."55 Moreover,
the legislative history of § 410, as discussed in the House Report,
noted that subsection (a) is intended to set forth basic duties of
the Register with respect to registration; it does not even
intimate a link to federal jurisdiction prerequisites.5 6
The second and, tellingly, final section of Title 17 analyzed by
the Corbis court was repeatedly referred to as "§ 412(a)," which
50 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2005).
51 See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (discussing § 410(a) as precluding registration
in absence of examination and approval).
52 See Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. American Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634
(M.D.N.C. 2004) (noting various ways section can and has been read); see also Ryan v.
Carl Corp., No. C 97-3873(FMS), 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9012 at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 15,
1998) (asserting "[a] close reading of the Act indicates that registration does not occur
until after the Copyright Office issues a certificate of registration").
53 308 F. Supp. 2d 630 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
54 See Iconbazaar, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 634. It is important to note that the court, like
many other courts which rule on this issue, did not provide a detailed rationale for
reaching this conclusion. For a general discussion of the various ways the registration
provisions can be read see Iconbazaar, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 633-34.
55 17 U.S.C. § 410 (2005).
56 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976) (discussing revision to § 410 and purpose of each
subsection).
2006] STRICT REQUIREMENTS IN COPYRIGHT LITIGATION 429
was cited as providing an important exception to the rules of
registration.57 It is significant to note that the court was
mistaken in its designation; the section it intended to reference
was merely the second sentence of § 411(a). In pertinent part, §
411(a) instructs that "where the deposit, application, and fee
required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright
Office in proper form and registration has been refused, the
applicant is entitled to institute an action for infringement,"
(emphasis added).58 Employing the logic of the legal maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the Corbis court read this
sentence of § 411(a), in combination with § 410(a), to parse out a
specific group which may invoke federal jurisdiction (to wit, those
who have received a final determination).59 Thus, in the court's
view, by implication, all others (i.e., those whose registrations are
currently pending or those who have not registered at all) are
excluded. 60
Firstly, as noted above, with regards to the chronological steps
of statutory interpretation, the court should not have applied the
logic of a legal maxim if it were truly ceasing its analysis upon
the primary "plain language" step. The court repeatedly avowed
that the inquiry was determined by the clarity of the plain
language. 61 More importantly, numerous courts prefer an
undeniably more logical, and straightforward, application of this
exception; they reason that this section necessarily indicates that
parties who apply for registration, regardless of the Register's
"later decision," 62 are conferred with the standing to bring suit.63
57 See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.Com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1112 (W.D. Wash.
2004) (discussing courts' reliance on this "important exception" to reach "application-on-
registration" conclusion).
58 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2005); see also Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1112. (noting
exception to reach "application-on-registration" conclusion).
59 See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (noting that "final determination" reading is
the most straightforward way to read § 411(a), taking all noted sections in consideration).
60 See id. at 1112-13 (reasoning that totality of § 411(a) essentially names those
groups who may invoke jurisdiction).
61 See id. (stating court's conclusion is supported by statute's plain language).
62 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2005) (specifying "the owner of a copyright... may obtain
registration of the copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit
specified by this section"); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976) (commenting that "[s]uch
registration is not a condition of copyright protection").
63 See Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 294, 296 (4th Cir. 1978) (noting suit for
infringement can be brought so long as Register is notified of litigation); see also Foraste
v. Brown Univ., 248 F. Supp. 2d 71, 77 (D.R.I. 2003) (stating submission of application,
deposit, and fee triggers registration for purposes of standing); Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp.
985, 994 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (discussing similarity of jurisdictional outcome regardless of
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These courts reason that because the language confers litigants
with standing regardless of the Register's decision, the
application alone is sufficient to confer standing.
This reading is likewise vehemently supported by the leading
treatise on Copyright, Nimmer, which proffers that "[b]y virtue of
that language, a party who seeks to register may proceed to
litigate the claim, regardless of whether the Copyright Office
ultimately issues the certificate, or by contrast denies it."64
Nimmer reasons that this is the "better point of view" because
the applicant, at the time she has submitted the application, can
take no further steps and will eventually be able to proceed
regardless of the final determination of her application.65 Hence,
in his learned view, it is merely the "application for registration"
that is a pre-condition to the grant of federal standing.66
C. Failure to Consider the Copyright Act in its Entirety
1. Neglect in Analyzing All Relevant Contexts in Which the
Language is Used
As discussed, the court purported to rely upon a strict
statutorily-based examination in order to reach its conclusion on
the requisite timing of "registration."67 The court was willing, as
indicated above, to look at both § 410 and § 411 to ascertain
Congressional intent. Its second chief flaw, however, was failing
to incorporate all of the relevant Title 17 "registration" sections
into its analysis, once it conceded to look beyond just one. As
previously outlined, the methods of determining statutory
"ambiguity" are grounded not only in the language itself, but also
whether application is granted or denied); Gable-Leigh, Inc. v. North Am. Miss, No. CV
01-01019 MMM(SHX), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25614, at *13 (C.D. Cal. April 9, 2001)
(citing Dielsi court).
64 NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, § 7.16[B][1][a][i], at 18-20
(supporting proposition that party who seeks to register may proceed to litigate claim,
regardless of whether Copyright Office has made final determination).
65 Id. at 23-29 (adding that allowing suits to proceed without "final determination" is
better point of view because it comports with statutory structure).
66 Id. at 18-29 (proposing "application for registration" is requirement for federal
standing).
67 See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (noting court will not expand statutory
language).
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in the specific context in which the language is used.6S Courts
that champion the registration-on-application approach have
relied on other relevant satellite sections of the Copyright Act,
and the way in which they shed an informative light on § 411(a).
In the first instance, § 408(a), which deals with "copyright
registration in general," states that "the owner of copyright or of
any exclusive right in the work may obtain registration of the
copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit
specified by this section, together with the application and fee
specified."69 It further states, as is supported by the subsequent
historical congressional notation, that "[s]uch registration is not
a condition of copyright protection."70 The Corbis court neglected
to even acknowledge this section, let alone accede to any
particular reading of it, perhaps finding it outside the scope of
relevancy. A number of courts have interpreted this section to
indicate that injunctive, rather than legal, relief is available in
the absence of a certificate of registration. 71 This approach is
sound given the discussion, infra, on the historical progression of
copyright registration. Other courts, however, have taken a
broader stance, and regarded the section as determinative
support for the registration-on-application approach. 72
Proponents of this reading posture, without detailed
examination, that, at a minimum, this section renders § 411
more problematic, if it does not completely contradict it.73
68 See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004)
(noting "fundamental canon" of statutory construction that words of statute must be read
in context of statutory scheme as a whole); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,
143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (elaborating on notion of looking at spirit of statute in
accordance with intention of statute's drafters).
69 14 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2005).
70 14 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2005); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976).
71 See Olan Mills Inc. v. Linn Photo Co., 23 F.3d 1345, 1349 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding
that injunctive relief is not limited to registered copyrights); see also Foraste v. Brown
Univ., 248 F. Supp. 2d 71, 76 (D.R.I. 2003) (discussing support for registration-on-
application approach).
72 See Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. American Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634
(M.D.N.C. 2004) (noting section's support for registration-on-application approach). But
see Corbis Corp. v. UGO Networks Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 520, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating
that "may" indicates application is preliminary, and any other reading would require
replacing "may" with "shall").
73 See UGO Networks, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 522 (discussing plaintiffs reliance on §
408(a)); see also Morgan, Inc. v. White Rock Distilleries, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D.
Me. 2002) (demonstrating copyright registration is "jurisdictional prerequisite" to
copyright holder's right to enforce that copyright in federal court).
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Last, but certainly not least, § 410(d) of the Copyright Act
similarly escaped the Corbis court's review. This section states
that "[t]he effective date of a copyright registration is the day on
which an application, deposit, and fee, which are later
determined by the Register of Copyrights ... to be acceptable for
registration, have all been received in the Copyright Office." 74
Numerous courts understand this section to reveal that
registration is in fact complete upon submission of an application,
i.e., when the Office has received all of the application
materials. 75  The advocates of this position defend their
interpretation on the ground that the statute mandates that the
merits of the application are "later determined" at some point
after the right to bring suit is conferred. 76 It is worth noting,
although the argument was not raised by the Corbis court, that
several courts which support the "final determination" approach
merely read this section to suggest that if the application is
approved, the registration will be "backdated" to the date the
application was received. 77 However, this approach, ironically,
runs contrary to the plain language of the provision, the step
preferred by the Corbis court, which indicates that "registration
occurs on the day the Copyright Office receives all of the
necessary application materials."78
2. Disregard of the Broader Statutory Scheme
As previously asserted, the Supreme Court dictates that a
court must attempt to clarify the "ambiguity" of the statutory
language not just through the language of the statute, but
through the specific contexts in which the language is used, and,
74 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (2005) (emphasis added).
75 See Iconbazaar, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 634 (holding copyright registration is effective
on day in which application, deposit, and fee have all been received); see also Foraste, 248
F. Supp. 2d at 77 (noting effective date of copyright registration is day on which
application, deposit, and fee have been received by Copyright Office); International
Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass'n v. Power Washers of North America, 81 F. Supp. 2d 70,
72 (D.D.C. 2000) (discussing day in which application materials are received by Copyright
Office constitutes effective date of copyright registration).
76 See Foraste, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (discussing why section most aptly supports
registration-on-application).
77 See Brush Creek Media Inc. v. Boujaklian, No. C-02-3491(EDL), 2002 WL 1906620,
*3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2002) (discussing argument that Copyright Office must register
after examination); see also Ryan v. Carl Corp., No. C 97-3873(FMS), 1998 WL 320817, *2
(N.D. Cal. July 15, 1998) (holding section does not indicate that an application is
considered registered while it is pending).
78 Foraste, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 77.
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finally, through the broader context of the statute as a whole. 79
In addition to its failure to analyze all of the relevant
"registration" sections, the court also fell short of a thorough
analysis when it chose not to review the overall statutory
purpose and scheme of the Copyright Act. The overall statutory
design, and the purposes governing registration requirements,
pointedly supports the registration-on-application approach.0
Firstly, 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) provides for a three-year statute of
limitations for copyright infringement actions.S1 Because the
process of "evaluating a copyright application could be a lengthy
one," it is illogical to permit the infringing use to "continue
unchallenged if the owner is not allowed to begin suit."82
Furthermore, endorsing such a delay in copyright protection is
against the Copyright Office's own example: in reaction to the
Anthrax scare of 2001-2002, during which the postal service
experienced understandable delays, the Copyright Office adopted
regulations requiring, in periods of postal service interruption,
"backdating the date of receipt of applications to the date on
which they otherwise would have been received." 83
Secondly, in reviewing the historical progression of the
registration requirements in the United States, Nimmer explains
that the amendments to the Copyright Act have been crafted so
as to preserve the ultimate benefits of registration: useful public
records (specifically to give notice to those who search for current
registrations), and to "ensure an efficient acquisition program for
79 See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (stating interpretation
method firmly established by prior Supreme Court decisions); see also Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981) (explaining courts
first look to statutory language, then proceed to review legislative history and other
statutory aids to determine congressional intent); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (elaborating on notion of spirit of statute in accordance
with intention of statute's drafters); Adams v. Dole, 927 F.2d 771, 774 (4th Cir. 1991)
(outlining interpretive progression taken by court when there is issue of statutory
construction and/or ambiguity).
80 See Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. American Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634
(M.D.N.C. 2004) (noting support from overall statutory scheme simply buttresses already
adequate direct statutory support); see also Secure Services Tech., Inc. v. Time & Space
Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1354, 1364 (E.D. Va. 1989) (positing any other approach
would leave plaintiff "in legal limbo" while Copyright Office processed applications).
81 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2005) (stating "[n]o civil action shall be maintained under the
provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued").
82 Iconbazaar, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 634 (discussing how § 507(b) supports registration-
on-application approach).
83 Id. at 634 n.4 (noting Copyright Office's sensitivity to length of application process).
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the Library of Congress."84 Additionally, one of the central
objectives of the Copyright Act is to protect "any original work of
authorship."85 One cannot legitimately posit that any of these
registration functions, or the aim of copyright protection
generally, is furthered by barring court access to litigants
because the party has not yet received the certificate, or denial,
in hand. Quite to the contrary, as protection of authors is a
central tenet of Copyright Law, the courts should construe the
statute to further that aim.8 6
D. Deficiencies in Application of Outside Interpretive Tools
As repeatedly referenced, the Corbis court was content to cease
its analysis upon what it considered to be an unambiguous "plain
reading" of the explicit statutory language. As is commonly held,
a court is required to look beyond the plain language of the
statute to other principles of construction if the statute is at all
ambiguous as to Congressional intent.8 7 Because the relevant
provisions here can, and have been, read in more than one way,
an examination of legislative history and public policy rationales
are necessary subsequent steps in ascertaining Congressional
intent.88 The Corbis court failed to account for either of these
readily accessible external sources in its final analysis.
84 NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, § 7.16[B][1I[c], at 33-35 and §
7.16[H], at 1-5.
85 Walton v. General Services Admin., No. 02-3272-CM, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7900,
*1 (D. Kan. Jan. 15, 2004); Randy S. Kravis, Comment, Does A Song By Any Other Name
Still Sound As Sweet?: Digital Sampling And Its Copyright Implications, 43 AM. U.L.
REV. 231, 240 (1993) (citing purpose of 1976 Copyright Act).
86 See State v. Keawe, 108 P.3d 304, 307 (Haw. 2005) (reviewing established rules of
statutory construction); see also Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 111 P.3d 73, 84
(Idaho 2005) (noting that public policy behind statute is important tool); State v.
Schwartz, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (Idaho 2003) (highlighting importance of not only literal words
but also public policy behind statute when determining legislative intent).
87 See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (noting reference to
legislative history is unnecessary where language is plain); see also Adams v. Dole, 927
F.2d 771, 774 (4th Cir. 1991) (explaining that legislative history perusal follows plain
language analysis).
88 See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (stating if statute is
ambiguous, i.e., subject to more than one interpretation, its meaning should be
determined from context in which it exists); see also Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. American
Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (explaining when court must look
beyond statutory language); Lopez v. State, 30 P.3d 952, 957 (Idaho 2001) (explaining
reasonableness of proposed interpretations is a factor in determining ambiguity of a
statute).
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1. Legislative History as Support for the Registration-on-
Application Approach
The canons of statutory interpretation make clear that an
examination of legislative history is imperative if Congressional
intent is not apparent from the statutory language; and only
after reviewing the history can we resort to other tools of
construction.8 9 In the case of copyright registrations, an analysis
of legislative history makes clear that Congress has, over the
years, made significant attempts to provide greater protection to
''authors" and to loosen the procedural restraints in securing that
protection. While copyright registration was once required as a
precondition to securing any protection for a work, Congress
eradicated the requirement with the first revision of the
Copyright Act in 1802.90 (It is clear that a failure to register is
not fatal to the applicant's substantive interest in the copyright,
as courts have almost unanimously held that failure to obtain a
registration certificate does not bar a claim for equitable relief.) 91
Moreover, in a later attempt to relax the stringent registration
standards, Congress, in 1989, eliminated the 1909 Act's provision
which required notice on published works as a prerequisite to
protection.92 Further, failure to obtain approval from the
Register was fatal to an applicant under the 1909 Act, whereas
89 See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453, 458 (1974) (noting order of statutory interpretative steps); see also Stupy v. United
States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing that search for
legislative intent begins with language, followed by historical analysis); Adams, 927 F.2d
at 774 (4th Cir. 1991) (explaining analysis of legislative history precedes use of tools of
statutory construction).
90 See John Presper, Copyright Restoration Under § 104A: Rethinking Copyright
Law's First Amendment Immunity, 18 CONN. J. INT'L L. 431, 434 (2002) (stating although
registration requirements were made more stringent in 1802, publication requirement of
registration was eliminated in 1831); see also Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing
Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 493 (2004) (noting while 1909 Act retained many 1831
Act registration requirements, it "softened" them); Shira Perlmutter, Freeing Copyright
from Formalities, 13 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 565, 568 (1995) (asserting 1972 Act's
purpose was to eliminate formalities in copyright law and it eliminated "the need to
register as a condition to the validity of a copyright").
91 See Olan Mills Inc. v. Linn Photo Co., 23 F.3d 1345, 1349 (8th Cir. 1994)
(reiterating that injunctive relief is not bound by registration); see also Pacific and
Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1499 n.17 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting statute does
not impose a registration requirement for injunctive relief); Foraste v. Brown Univ., 248
F.Supp.2d 71, 77 (D.R.I. 2003) (citing numerous cases which held equitable interests as
not tied to registration).
92 See Crews, supra note 2, at 571 (noting notice was required on published works
prior to 1989); see also NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, § 7.16[A][2][b] at
1-5 (discussing how pre-1978 works obtained copyright protection).
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the current Act permits "a court of competent jurisdiction to hold
that the refusal of the copyright Office to issue such a certificate
was erroneous,"93 greatly expanding the potential arena for
protection.
Finally, direct reference to the language of House Report 1476,
and the manner in which Congress itself used the term
"registration," provides further support for the registration-on-
application approach. While it can be argued that Congress used
the term "registration" to apply to the certificate granted or
denied after an applicant's application, this is not the most
accurate reading. House Report 1476, in discussing § 411(a),
indicates that one who has "sought registration and has been
refused" and, in other language, "a rejected claimant who has
properly applied for registration," may bring suit for
infringement.94 However, this is neither the most common nor
illuminating use of the phrase "registration" in the House Report.
More often, the House Report refers to registration as an act
performed by the copyright owner. In reference to section §
411(a), prior to the previous quotation, the Report indicates that
the owner can have a cause of action though he "has not
registered his claim," but that he cannot enforce his right in court
until "he has made registration."95 Further, in discussing § 408
("Copyright registration in general"), the House Report indicates
that under section (a), registration "can be made voluntarily by
'the owner of copyright' at any time during the copyright term."96
As discussed, supra, this section proceeds to state that the claim
"may be registered" through deposit of the copies, application and
fee. 97 Finally, in reference to § 412 ("Registration as prerequisite
to certain remedies for infringement"), the House Report
discusses that statutory remedies should not be provided to an
93 NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, § 716[B][1][b][i] at 1-9 (discussing
historical progression of registration requirements); see Arthur Levine, The End of
Formalities: No More Second-Class Copyright Owners, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 553
(1993) (arguing "[tihe history of copyright law in the United States reflects the gradual
elimination of formalities").
94 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 157 (1976) (discussing second and third sentence of §
411(a)).
95 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 157 (describing registration as prerequisite to federal
subject matter jurisdiction).
96 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 152 (discussing "permissive registration") (emphasis
added).
97 See supra, note 69.
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owner for infringement unless she has "by registration, made a
public record of his copyright claim."98 Yet, because we know, per
§ 411(a) that this "public record" is made regardless of the
Register's final determination, the language persuasively
indicates that the certificate merely acts as a receipt for the
registration which occurs upon "application."
2. Public Policy as an Extrinsic Interpretive Aid
Yet another extrinsic tool available to help courts discern
Congressional intent is the "reasonableness" of the proposed
construction. 99 As summarized by the U.S. Supreme Court,
"nothing is better settled than that statutes should receive a
sensible construction ... so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion."100 Moreover, even "[i]f a literal construction of the
words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to
avoid the absurdity. The court must restrain the words."101
Nevertheless, the courts which hold that issuance of the
registration certificate is a jurisdictional prerequisite habitually
concede that such an application "leads to an inefficient and
peculiar result."102 Alternatively, courts that champion the
registration-on-application route typically conclude that such a
result "best effectuates the interests of justice and [the promotion
98 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 158 (explaining differences in common law protection
versus "extraordinary" remedies of statutory damages and attorney's fees).
99 See Smith v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 48 F.2d 861, 866 (W.D. Pa. 1931) (stating
fundamental rule that effects and consequences of construction should be considered); see
also Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcon, 111 P.3d 73, 83 (Idaho 2005) (discussing steps
to take when statutory language is ambiguous); State v. Schwartz, 79 P.3d 719, 721
(Idaho 2003) (noting that "reasonableness" must be considered when determining intent).
100 In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 667 (1897) (relying on construction which allowed
for sensible outcome); see Church of The Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 461
(1892) (asserting that proposed construction would lead to absurd result); Herold v. Blair,
158 F. 804, 806 (3rd Cir. 1908) (rejecting approach that would demonstrate unreasonable
congressional intent).
101 Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 460 (discussing that plain language must be read in light
of object of act); see Carolene Products Co. v. Mahoney, 294 F. 902, 903 (Mass. Dist. Ct.
1923) (citing to Holy Trinity for proposition that, even where a criminal act requires strict
construction, plain language is not controlling where result is inconceivable); Ozawa v.
United States, 260 U.S. 178, 196 (1922) (noting an obvious absurdity requires exception to
general rule of adhering to plain language).
102 Ryan v. Carl Corp., No. C 97-3873(FMS), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9012, 7-8 (N.D.
Cal. July 15, 1998) (holding application is only first step towards registration despite
inefficient outcome); see Loree Rodkin Management Corp. v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 315 F.
Supp. 2d 1053, 1056-57 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (agreeing, reluctantly, with Ryan court);
Strategy Source Inc. v. Lee, 233 F. Supp. 2d. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting inefficient result is
required because Congress' intent is clear).
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of] judicial economy."103 Nimmer himself quoted such language in
his treatise on Copyright Law and maintained that this "more
common practice" [to allow suits to proceed upon application] is,
in the simplest terms, the "better point of view."104
III. SWEEPING INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S
DECISION
A. International Influences on Copyright Law Development
As discussed, Copyright Law is essentially a creature of
statutory lineage, its original ancestry sprung from the structure
of the Constitution.10 5 While overhauling the common law,
Congress has developed a comprehensive statutory structure. 106
International Copyright treaties, however, are the source of the
most significant developments in recent American Copyright
Law.lO7 One treaty in particular has sparked significant changes
in American law, namely, the Berne Convention.108 The Berne
Convention was "the first multilateral copyright treaty in
history," and though it was at first ratified by only ten European
nations in 1886, it "quickly became the foremost means of
103 International Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass'n v. Power Washers of North
America, 81 F. Supp. 2d 70, 72 (D.D.C. 2000) (endorsing registration-on-application
approach).
104 NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, § 7.16[B][1][a][i], at 24-30
(contemplating that registration-on-application is optimal interpretation of § 411 on
several fronts).
105 See NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing general history
of Copyright Law); Rashida Y.V. MacMurray, Trademarks or Copyrights: Which
Intellectual Property Right Affords Its Owner the Greatest Protection of Architectural
Ingenuity?, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 111, 112 (2005) (giving brief overview of
Copyright Law).
106 See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000) (preempting common-law copyright); Crews, supra
note 2, at 550 (listing various Congressional enactments which have altered Copyright
Law over time).
107 See Crews, supra note 2, at 557 (noting Berne Convention, Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of the World Trade Organization and
WIPO Copyright Treaty); Elaine B. Gin, International Copyright Law: Beyond the WIPO
& TRIPS Debate, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 763, 764 (2004) (discussing that
developed countries seek copyright protection through international harmonization).
108 See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853 (1988) [hereinafter BCIA]; see also NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, §
7.16[B][1][b][iii], at 1-6 and [B][1][c], at 12-17 (discussing effects of Berne Convention
accession on American Copyright Law); Emio F. Zizza, Note, Eliminating the Preferential
Treatment of Foreign Works Under United States Copyright Law: Possible Impacts of the
Copyright Reform Bill of 1993, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 681, 690-91 (1995) (examining
Berne Convention as catalyst for comprehensive changes of 1976 Act).
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international copyright protection."109 In anticipation of adhering
to the Convention, which eventually occurred in 1989,110
Congress began to relax the traditional American formalities
which were prerequisite to copyright protection.l' Accordingly, a
significant portion of copyright law has been "enacted in
furtherance of [global] harmonization."112
B. Creating Loopholes for International Harmonization
The Berne Convention specifically cautions that "[t]he
enjoyment and the exercise of these [copyright] rights shall not
be subject to any formality."113 Thus, in order to comport with the
relatively laissez-faire procedural system promulgated by the
Berne Convention, the sharply divided Congress, pursuant to "an
extensive legislative debate,"114 fashioned what Nimmer refers to
as "the crucial compromise."11 5 In effect, the agreed-upon
language of the Berne Convention Implementation Act116 created
a registration exception "for actions for infringement of copyright
in Berne Convention works whose country of origin is not the
United States.""l 7 Thus, though United States citizens were,
109 Zizza, supra note 108, at 686 (discussing long history of Berne Convention prior to
United States accession).
110 See NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 2 (noting United States
joined Berne Convention after having joined Universal Copyright Convention in 1955);
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, § 7.16[B] [1] [b] [iii], at 1-4 (stating date of
"inauguration of the Berne era").
111 See NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 2 (discussing how Congress
"jettisoned" copyright note requirements); Crews, supra note 2, at 559 (noting restoration
of protection to many foreign works that lacked formalities previously required); Zizza,
supra note 108, at 691 (stating how 1976 Act eliminated a number of formalities).
112 Crews, supra note 2, at 561 (discussing international trend of Copyright Law
development).
113 Berne Convention for the Protection of the Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, revised, Paris, July 24, 1971, art. 5(2), 15 U.S.T. 1341; see NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, § 7.16[B][1][b][iii], at 28-34 (discussing that it "strains common
sense" to maintain ability to bring an action depends on formality, given Berne's
admonition); Crews, supra note 2, at 571-72 (noting formalities are "heretical" in the
Berne era).
114 NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, § 7.16[B][11[b][iii], at 4-16
(discussing primary difference between House and Senate bills regarded mandatory
registration as prerequisite to suit for infringement).
115 Id. § 7.16[B][1][b][iii], at 33-34 (discussing middle ground reached by Congress
was "historic compromise").
116 See BCIA, supra note 108.
117 BCIA, supra note 108, § 9 (b)(1)(B); see NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra
note 3, § 7.16[B][1][b][iii], at 35-37 (discussing exception to general rule that registration
is not prerequisite to copyright protection); Zizza, supra note 108, at 701-02 (discussing
controversial nature of Congressional compromise).
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ironically, disadvantaged in the international copyright
marketplace, Congress seemingly circumvented an objection for
non-compliance with the anti-formal thrust of the treaty.118
C. Disproportionate Burdens on American Authors in the
International Copyright Landscape
Congress, however, stacked an additional weight onto this
already heavy burden faced by American authors through the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act.119  They reversed the
language, such that instead of framing an exemption from
registration requirements for those whose origin is not the
United States, the section affirmatively provided that only
"United States works" must be registered before suit may be
instituted.120  The motivation was to "exempt from U.S.
registration requirements 'works from members of the two new
international treaties."' 121 The unfortunate sweeping effect,
however, was to release all others in the world, even those who
are not Berne members, nor who enjoy any copyright relations
with the United States at all, from registration requirements.122
What started as a loophole to join the preeminent international
Copyright Treaty, the Berne Convention, has swelled into a state
of affairs such that the restrictive requirements place a
disproportionately heavier burden on United States citizens than
118 See NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, § 7.16[B][1][b][iii], at 41-43
(discussing foreign authors could not argue that United States was setting up roadblocks
to protection); Crews, supra note 2, at 572 (noting United States registration
requirements have not been challenged for "non-compliance with Berne"); Zizza, supra
note 108, at 700 (analyzing compromises made to reach international uniformity).
119 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
[hereinafter DMCA] (enacted to execute WIPO Copyright Treaty).
120 DMCA, supra note 119, at Title I, § 102(d)(1)-(2) (implementing change in U.S.C.
Title 17 § 411(a)); 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (stating no infringement action for any United States
work shall be instituted without registration) (emphasis added); see NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, § 7.16[B][1][c], at 18-23 (discussing revisions to registration
requirements).
121 For a discussion regarding the internationally-conscious purpose behind the
amendment, see NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, § 7.16[B][1][c], at 24-25.
The two new WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) treaties at issue were the
WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. (emphasis
added).
122 See NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, § 7.16[B][1][c], at 25-33
(reviewing that unprotected foreign authors can claim protection without formalities
under new language); NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that
1998 amendments provide protection to "foreign nationals").
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anyone in the ever-growing global marketplace of copyright
protection.
CONCLUSION
Faced with the ever-evolving internationalization of Copyright
Law, and the burdensome restrictions on United States authors
who are bound by 17 U.S.C. § 411, it behooves the judiciary
system to refrain from unnecessarily, and illogically, placing yet
another saddle on those American parties seeking to protect their
infringed works. While the debate on the effective date of
registration continues to simmer in District and Circuit Courts,
the issue is unlikely to reach the Supreme Court, as parties are
prone to continue to find it more efficient to amend a complaint
after their application has been approved or denied, rather than
appeal the issue to a higher court. 123 However, in the interests of
litigant certainty, judicial efficiency, international uniformity
and evenhanded protection for authors from the United States, it
is critical that Congress intervene and implement the
registration-on-application approach into the Copyright Act.
123 See Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 365-66
(5th Cir. 2005) (reviewing courts that find jurisdictional defect cured when application
was "processed" after party initiated suit); see also M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. American
Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486,1488-89 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding irrelevant mere technicality
between filing new complaint versus amended complaint); Zito v. Steeplechase Films, 267
F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that jurisdictional defect was cured).

